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Maternity and parental leave policies are on the forefront of the current political agenda in Canada. 
This paper answers the question: does maternity and parental leave (M/PL) policy raise or lower the 
probability of employment for women? One unique feature of M/PL policy in Canada is the variation in 
mandated unpaid job-protected leave allowances across provinces. This variation is used in this study 
to identify the effect of provincial M/PL policies on employment rates of women with young children. 
Using the Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from 1976 to 2000, I find evidence that M/PL 
policy reduces the gap between the employment probabilities of women with young children versus 
women with older children. Moreover, a difference-in-differences model predicts a 3 to 4 percent 
increase in the probability of employment for women with young children (aged 0 to 2) relative to 





Maternity and parental leave (M/PL) policy is on the forefront of the current political 
agenda in Canada.
1 In the 1999 Speech from the Throne, the Government of Canada announced 
an expansion of the maternity and parental benefits available under its Employment Insurance (EI) 
program.
2 This move was a part of the Government’s larger and continuing National Children’s 
Agenda aimed at improving the well-being of Canada’s children and providing support to parents 
and families.  In addition to more weeks of parental EI benefits, both federal and provincial 
governments have expanded the length of job-protected parental leave available under their 
respective Employment Standards Acts and Labour Codes. 
While these policy changes undoubtedly give parents greater flexibility in their children’s 
first year of life, little is known about the impact of M/PL policy on the parents’ labour market 
outcomes. Economic theories put forward to predict the impact of the M/PL policy on labour 
market outcomes leads to ambiguous conclusions (e.g., Klerman and Leibowitz, 1997). The right 
to job-protected maternity leave may lead mothers with a strong attachment to the labour force to 
take more time off work than they would in the absence of M/PL policy. However, for women with 
a weak attachment, it may mean that they remain attached to the labour force and return to work 
after childbirth instead of dropping out of the labour force for several years to rear their children. 
Given the ambiguous theoretical predictions, the effect of M/PL policy on labour market outcomes 
is an empirical question. 
Canada provides a unique opportunity for studying the impact of M/PL policy on labour 
market outcomes. While legislated benefits are paid through the federal employment insurance 
system, the right to job security during and after a leave of absence surrounding the birth or 
adoption of a child is granted by provincial and federal labour standards legislation.  Provinces 
have implemented M/PL policy at different times and to differing degrees, so there is cross-
provincial variation in the policy at a point in time and substantial within-province variation over 
time; this provides a unique opportunity to empirically assess the impact of these policies.  In spite 




Canadian M/PL policy and none of them exploits the provincial variation.
3 
This paper estimates the effect of provincial M/PL on the employment rates of women with 
young children. The paper is divided into six sections.  Section II describes the history of maternity 
and parental leave legislation in Canada.  Both unemployment/employment insurance (UI/EI) 
benefits and provincial unpaid leave allowances are discussed.
4 Section III reviews current 
literature on the impact of M/PL policy on labour market outcomes. Section IV describes the 
estimation strategy and econometric model.   Section V describes the data used and provides a 
descriptive look at female employment rates from 1976 to 2000. The results are found in section 
VI.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Maternity and Parental Leave Legislation in Canada 
Legislation protecting women’s labour market position after childbirth falls under both 
provincial and federal jurisdiction in Canada.  First, unpaid leaves of absence are granted by 
provincial and federal employment standards legislation.
5 Second, benefit payments while on 
maternity or parental leave are covered by the federal UI/EI legislation and private or union 
contracts. Third, general human rights statutes provide additional rights.
6 Note that the provincial 
and federal employment standards legislation only stipulates the minimum standards that firms 
must adopt.  In general, it is possible for firms to offer longer leaves and more generous benefits.  
For example, registered supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB) plans allow firms to provide 




Provincial and federal employment standards give employees the right to time off during 
pregnancy and in order to care for newborn (or newly adopted) children.
8 At the end of the 1960s, 
the provinces of British Columbia and New Brunswick introduced legislation to protect the health 
and job security of women workers before and after childbirth.
9 The federal government amended 
the Canada Labour Code, in 1970 to include similar provisions.




comparable legislation over the next two decades; by 1988 all provinces and territories had 
implemented minimum leave allowances.  
Provincial legislation was founded on the principal of protecting the mother’s health as 
well as the employer’s interests. Applicants are generally required to have a minimum tenure with 
their current employer in order to qualify for an unpaid leave of absence. The required tenure 
ranges from 0 weeks to 12 months depending on jurisdiction. In addition, five provinces 
(Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia) require that six 
weeks of post-natal leave be taken. Since the introduction of M/PL legislation, provinces have 
expanded their legislation in order to give pregnant women and new parents more rights.  For 
example, provisions have been included to protect women against a layoff due to their pregnancy. 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions (federal, British Columbia, Northwest Territories and the Yukon) 
women on maternity leave have the right to any wage increases or promotions that they would 
have received had they not been on leave. In addition, in some jurisdictions seniority and benefits 
continue to accrue while on leave.  
The most notable changes that have occurred over time are the increasing flexibility in the 
timing with which a woman can take her maternity leave (provinces now require pre-natal leave 
only in certain circumstances) and the addition of parental and adoption leave. Parental leave can 
be shared between parents and allows fathers to take a leave of absence to care for a newly born 
(or adopted) child. More importantly, the introduction of parental leave resulted in increases in the 
maximum total weeks of leave for women. A summary of the maximum unpaid job-protected leave 
available in the ten provinces and the federal jurisdiction can be found in Table 1.   
 
Benefits 
Provincial legislation only provides for a job-protected, unpaid absence from work. 
However, employers may provide payments during the absence and, through the federal 
employment insurance program, all workers who meet specified qualification requirements can 




introduced in 1971 when the Unemployment Insurance Act (UI Act) replaced previously existing 
legislation. Adoption benefits were introduced in 1985 and, in 1990 parental benefits (which 
included adoption benefits, therefore replacing existing adoption benefits) were introduced. The 
introduction of 10 weeks of parental benefits (which could be shared between parents) 
significantly increased the amount of benefits available to birth mothers, with an increase in the 
maximum total weeks of benefits from fifteen to twenty five (a combination of 15 weeks of 
maternity benefits and 10 weeks of parental benefits). In 1996 the Employment Insurance Act (EI 
Act) replaced the UI Act. With the implementation of the EI Act, the employment requirements 
were changed from a minimum number of weeks to a minimum number of hours of work in the 
year prior to M/PL. In 2001, parental benefits were further extended to a total of 35 weeks bringing 
the total combined maternity and parental benefits available to birth mothers to 50 weeks (15 
weeks of maternity benefits and 35 weeks of parental benefits). The amount of benefits paid to 
new parents is based on a percentage of insurable earnings in the year prior to childbirth. Further 
details about the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 and the Employment Insurance Act, 1996 
can be found in the Appendix. 
Inherent in the structure of the legislation in Canada is the possibility of a lack of 
coordination between the federal and provincial governments.  Maternity leave was introduced in 
most provinces after the Unemployment Insurance Act allowed for benefits. During the transition 
period, a woman was able to collect benefits if she took time off after giving birth but her job was 
not protected by legislation. Hence, if she did not have an agreement with her employer from 
before the birth, she was not guaranteed her same job upon her return to the labour force.  It took 
until 1982 before all provinces had some form of maternity leave legislation in place. Moreover, it 
took some provinces a few years after the introduction of parental benefits to adapt their provincial 
labour codes to bring them in line with the changes to federal legislation.  In fact, Alberta did not 
provide any parental leave until 2001. For a woman in Alberta, this meant that prior to 2001 she 
would risk losing her job if she collected the full number of weeks of benefits to which she was 




Given that UI/EI benefits are administered federally, all new parents face the same 
legislation when it comes to benefits. Differences that arise across provinces in the average 
number of weeks and dollars of M/PL benefits received will be due to the varying likelihood of 
meeting the requirements for qualifying for benefits in the different regions of Canada and 
provincial variations in average incomes.  Once an employee qualifies for M/PL benefits, the 
duration of benefits available is the same across all provinces. Moreover, the total length of 
benefits available to a birth mother has changed only three times, with the introduction of 
maternity leave benefits in 1971, the introduction of parental leave benefits in 1990 and their 
expansion in 2001.  In contrast, the right to an unpaid, job-protected leave of absence varies by 
province and over time.  This latter aspect of the legislation will be used in this study to identify the 
impact of maternity leave legislation on female employment rates. 
 
III. Literature 
To date there are only a handful of papers on the labour market effects of Canadian M/PL 
policy.
11  Phipps (2000) used the Labour Market Activities Survey (1988-1990) to study labour 
market behaviour preceding childbirth. She found that women do not seem to increase their labour 
supply in the year preceding birth suggesting that women do not alter their labour market 
behaviour in order to qualify for maternity and parental leave benefits. She further finds that fertility 
is not sensitive to the availability of maternity benefits.  
Marshall (1999), using the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), found that 
while 16% of paid workers returned to work by the end of the first month after childbirth, 80% of 
the self-employed returned in that first month.  She further found that 89% of mothers returned to 
the same work status (full-time versus part-time) after childbirth and 83% returned to the same 
employer. Marshall (2003) using the Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (EICS) found that 
the average time away from work rose from 6 months in 2000 to about 10 months in 2001. This 
increase was correlated with the extension of parental benefits under the Canadian Employment 




likely to participate in the program. 
While Phipps, Burton and Lethbridge (2001) do not specifically investigate maternity and 
parental leave, their paper provides some evidence on the importance of M/PL policy for 
improving labour market outcomes for women. Using the Canadian General Social Survey, 1995 
they find that general interruptions to paid work (e.g., maternity leave, layoffs, and quits) involving 
a change in job upon return to work result in a downward shift in earnings profiles which is greater 
than would occur from lost experience alone.  Furthermore, they find that an interruption followed 
by a return to the old job bears no additional cost beyond the lost return to experience.  Their 
results suggest that maternity and parental leave programs will reduce the penalty associated with 
a job interruption for women who have children by allowing them to retain their jobs after 
childbirth. Moreover, in a report prepared for Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC, 
2001), Phipps finds that whether or not a mother received UI/EI did not affect the probability that 
she returned to the same job after childbirth.
12 She further found that those mothers whose leaves 
exceeded provincially available job-protected leaves were less likely to return to the same job. 
Therefore, it is not necessarily the right to paid leave that is important, but the right to job-
protected leave (paid or unpaid) that is relevant for the employment rate of women with young 
children. 
Given the scarcity of Canadian research on the labour market impact of maternity or 
parental leave policy, we must look to international research to provide more evidence in this area. 
Most other industrialized countries have also implemented some kind of M/PL policy (Ruhm 1998; 
Phipps 1995).  Recent research on M/PL policy in other countries focuses on several different 
issues. First, M/PL policy is expected to have an impact on employment rates, labour force 
attachment and the duration of leave after childbirth. Second, the policy is also hypothesized to 
have an effect on tenure, wages and job continuity. More recently, research has turned to the 
impact of M/PL policy on child health. 
Ruhm (1998), in a study of 16 European countries, finds that the right to paid leave raises 




Zveglich and van der Meulen Rodgers (2003) find that the introduction and enforcement of 
maternity leave in Taiwan led to a rise in the employment rate of young women by 2.5 percent. 
The results of Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) with regard to the employment rate are more 
ambiguous. They find that the estimated effect of state mandated maternity leave is sensitive to 
model specification and conclude that some of the increase in employment was due to 
improvements in economic conditions. Rønsen and Sundström (1996 and 2002) find that the right 
to paid maternity leave with job security increases the probability of employment in the three years 
after childbirth in Norway, Finland and Sweden. 
Waldfogel (1998), in addition to investigating the impact of maternity leave on employment 
probabilities, also focuses on the positive effect of returning to the previous job after childbirth on 
work experience, job tenure and pay. Finally, Waldfogel, Higuchi and Abe (1999), in a study using 
data from the United States, Britain and Japan, find that family leave coverage increases the 
likelihood a woman returns to her previous employer after childbirth. 
 
IV. Estimation Strategy 
In this paper, the impact of M/PL entitlement on the probability of employment is 
estimated in the spirit of the difference-in-differences model outlined by Angrist and Krueger 
(1999). The difference-in-differences model identifies the effect of a policy by assuming that the 
policy has an impact on the group of interest that it does not have on other groups. The model 
requires the selection of a comparison (or control) group where differences in the employment 
probability between the control group and the group of interest are not correlated with the variation 
in the policy. The difference in the changes in the outcomes of the two groups after changes in the 
legislation gives an estimate of the true effect of the legislation on the group of interest. 
This study assumes that because only new mothers are eligible for maternity and/or 
parental leave (paid or unpaid), M/PL policy has a direct impact on new mothers. The LFS data 
used here codes the age of the youngest child in a household as a categorical variable, hence, 




youngest child is aged 3-5 are used as a control group.  While other control groups have been 
used in the literature (e.g., single males, childless women, and older women), these women seem 
more likely to be similar to the women in the group of interest in terms of unobservable 
characteristics. For example, both groups of women have children who are not yet of school age 
and, hence, both groups will face child-care costs.
13 The women whose youngest child is aged 3 
to 5 are, however, no longer eligible for maternity and parental leave; it is, therefore, expected that 
the legislation will have a different impact on these two groups of mothers.  The similarity between 
these two groups on unobservable characteristics is an important feature in identifying the impact 
of M/PL policy statistically. 
I estimate the effect of M/PL policy on the likelihood that a mother is employed by using 
the following equation: 
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where  i Y  is a binary variable equal to 1 when a woman is employed and equal to 0 when 
she is not employed.  i X  contains a constant and individual characteristics and ychild is a binary 
variable equal to 1 when a woman’s youngest child is aged 0 to 2 and equal to 0 when the 
youngest child is aged 3 to 5.
14  The maxleave py  variable is equal to the number of weeks of job-
protected unpaid maternity and parental leave that is provided by labour legislation in each 
province and each year.  
Equation (1) is a probit equation where  ) . ( Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. If we 
difference this equation across provinces, years and the ychild variable, we would be left with  ml η  




women. The second,  , δ represents the differential impact of the legislation on women whose 
youngest child is aged 0 to 2. The inclusion of  ml η  allows for the possibility that M/PL policy also 
affects women with youngest child aged 3 to 5.
15 When  , 0 = ml η  there is no effect of M/PL policy 
on women with youngest child aged 3 to 5, when  0 ≠ ml η  there is an indirect effect of the policy. 
M/PL policy may indirectly affect women whose youngest child is aged 3 to 5 as the presence and 
length of M/PL may be correlated with the political and social culture towards working mothers.  
The coefficient,  ml η , picks up the effects of province and time specific differences that are not 
captured by either the provincial or year effects. For women with a child aged 0 to 2, the total 
effect of M/PL policy on the probability of employment is  δ η + ml  but it is the differential 
impact, , δ that we are interested in here.  
Instead of simply comparing outcomes before and after the implementation of (or a 
change in) leave entitlement, equation (1) estimates the effect of the maximum available leave on 
employment status using all changes in the maximum leave entitlement. Note that this model 
assumes that fertility behaviour is exogenous to the policy. This assumption is supported by 
Phipps (2000). However, it could be challenged if it becomes evident that the advanced 
announcement of the government’s intention to extend parental leave EI benefits to 35 weeks as 
of January 1, 2001 is shown to have had fertility effects. Given that the intention was announced 
more than a year in advance, individuals planning on having children may have postponed 
pregnancy in order to take advantage of the new law. A similar argument could be made for the 
period when parental leave benefits were introduced, however, the changes may be less likely to 
have an impact on the total number of children a woman has than on the timing of those children. 
 
V. Data 
This study uses the public-use microdata files of the Canadian Labour Force Survey 




Canada. The LFS is a monthly survey of a sample of households containing civilian, non-
institutionalized persons aged 15 or older in Canada’s ten provinces.
16 The survey was 
redesigned both in 1976 and at the beginning of 1997. The changes in the survey in 1976 were 
significant, and therefore the sample included here starts in 1976.  Changes to the survey in 1997 
were also significant but mainly affected the categorization of the non-employed.  As this study 
classifies women as being either employed or not employed, the changes that occurred in 1997 
will not significantly affect the measurement of the classification of employment status used here.  
As such, the sample used here encompasses the period 1976 to 2000. 
The LFS has a rotating six-month panel design.  Households are surveyed for six 
consecutive months and then dropped.  Panels overlap so that at any point five-sixths of the 
sample is retained for the next month.  However, because the identifiers that link households from 
month to month were not available, the panel nature of the survey cannot be used each month 
must be treated individually.  This leads to a non-independence of observations associated with 
sampling the same household twice without the necessary information to determine which 
households are the same from month to month.  Only the March and September samples are 
used in order to circumvent this problem. 
Another reason to use only two sample months is the sheer size of the LFS.  Since 1990 
about 62,000 households per month have been surveyed. Keeping only the March and September 
files reduces the sample to a manageable size. From 1976 to 2000, there are 1,681,435 women 
aged 15-44 in the March and September samples combined.  Moreover, the sample of women 
with a youngest child aged 0-5 is close to 450,000.
17  Thus the size of the LFS proves to be one of 
the data’s major assets, easily allowing for provincial level analysis. 
Summary statistics for women whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2 (the group of interest) 
and 3 to 5 (the control group) can be found in Table 2. For the purpose of comparison, summary 
statistics for all women aged 15 to 44 have been included in the last column of the table. I have 
chosen the range 15 to 44 to approximate the childbearing age for women.
18  Less than one 




period, hence it seems reasonable to compare their characteristics with women under 45.
19  
Note that Table 2 contains statistics across all years in the sample period. 
The summary statistics suggest that both the labour force participation rate and the 
employment rate of women with young children (both aged 0 to 2 and 3 to 5) are below that of 
women aged 15 to 44 in general.
20 Moreover, women whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2 are less 
like to be participating in the labour force and are less likely to be employed than women whose 
youngest child is aged 3 to 5.  Women with young children are more likely to be married, and 
slightly more educated, than women (aged 15-44) in general.  However, one must interpret these 
figures in light of the fact that all women (from 1976 to 2000) have been included in the calculation 
of these statistics.  The raw percentages could be masking large generational differences in 
characteristics. For example, average educational attainment of women has increased over time. 
Women’s employment rates have increased dramatically since the 1970s.  Figure 1 
shows the trend in women’s employment rate over the sample period by depicting the average 
yearly employment rate for all provinces.  The top line represents the employment rate of all 
women aged 15 to 44.  There is a general upward trend until 1990 at which point the rate plateaus 
until the late-1990s, when the upward trend continues.  The middle line represents those women 
whose youngest child was aged 3 to 5 at the time they were surveyed.  The bottom line represents 
the women whose youngest child was aged 0 to 2.  Both lines are trending upwards over time. 
While there is also a leveling off in the early nineties, there appears to be a narrowing of the gap 
between women with young children and all women who are aged 15 to 44, particularly among 
those whose youngest child is aged 3 to 5. 
The provinces that represent the shortest mandated M/PL and the longest mandated 
M/PL during the sample period are Alberta and Québec, respectively. During this whole period, 
Alberta guaranteed a woman’s job for 18 weeks while Québec saw its job-protected leave 
increase from 0 weeks to 70 weeks.  Figures 2 through 4 depict the employment rates for Québec 
and Alberta. As can be seen in Figure 2, Québec’s employment rate has historically been below 




in the latter half of the 1970s to 8.5% in the latter half of the 1990s, the difference in the two 
employment rates remained statistically significant throughout the period.  A particularly interesting 
characteristic of the data is seen in Figures 3 and 4.  While Québec’s employment rate is below 
Alberta’s for women aged 15 to 44 and generally for women whose youngest child is aged 3-5 
(see Figure 3), this is not the case for women whose youngest child is aged 0-2.
21  Figure 4 shows 
that after initially being below Alberta’s employment rate, Quebec’s rate catches up to Alberta 
once maternity leave policy is implemented in Quebec in 1979.  Thereafter, the rates are 
statistically significant in only eight of the next 21 years. Four of those years Alberta’s employment 
rate for these women was above that of Quebec, during the other four Quebec’s rate was above 
Alberta’s. These three figures (2-4) suggest that job-protected M/PL policy may play a role in the 
employment rates of women with young children. Even though the employment rate of women in 
Quebec is generally below that of Alberta, this is not the case among precisely those women who 
are targeted by M/PL policy. 
 
VI. Results 
  Estimates of the model described in equation (1) are found in Table 3 and consist of 
standard probit-regression coefficients. In general, the coefficients on the control variables in 
Table 3 have the expected signs. Among women with young children, all factors held constant, 
those in Ontario and Prince Edward Island were the most likely to be employed and the probability 
of being employed has increased over time. The probability of employment for all women with 
young children peaks at age 30 to 34 and is the lowest for the youngest and the oldest in the 
sample. Employment increases with educational attainment with those with a University education 
being the most likely to be employed. The coefficient on the marital status dummy for single, 
never-married women suggests that the probability of employment is lower for single women than 
for married women (the omitted category).  This result is consistent with literature on lone mothers. 
The negative coefficient could also potentially be explained if single women within an age range 




closer to 20 on average than married women aged 20 to 24). The younger women are less 
likely to be employed, as indicated by the coefficients on the age categories. 
  Coefficients on the maximum job-protected leave variable and the interaction term (η  and 
δ ) are small compared to the coefficients on most other variables; they are, however, both 
significant at the one-percent level. Moreover, even though η  is negative, the overall effect of 
leave entitlement on the employment of women with youngest child aged 0 to 2, δ η + , is positive. 
Note, however, that in spite of the positive effect of M/PL policy, there is a strong negative 
association between the probability of employment and having the youngest child aged 0 to 2.
22 
  In addition to the maximum available job-protected leave (in each province and year), 
presence of a youngest child aged 0-2 and the interaction term between maximum leave and the 
young child variable, province and year dummies where also included.  Furthermore, the 
provincial (prime-age male) unemployment rate, marital status, age of respondent, educational 
attainment, and seasonality were also included as controls.
23  
  To understand the magnitude of the estimated effect of M/PL policy, Table 4 shows the 
predicted effect of increases in the weeks of available maternity/parental leave on the employment 
rate.  The predictions were calculated using the coefficients estimated in the model. Predictions 
are given for three provinces, two levels of education and five different lengths of available M/PL 
(including the current 52 weeks found in most provinces since 2001).  All figures are for 2000 and 
for a married woman aged 30 to 34 whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2.  The appropriate 2000 
provincial unemployment rate is used for each province.  The model predicts a 2.8 to 3.6 percent 
increase in the employment rate in the presence of leave.  This increase is statistically significant 
at the one-percent level. The result is similar to the 3 to 4 percent found by Ruhm (1998) for length 
of paid M/PL in European countries and the 2.5 percent increase in employment found by Zveglich 
and van der Meulen-Rodgers (1999) for Taiwan. Job-protected leave results in a larger increase in 
the employment rate of women with high school education than for those who are university 




to be higher regardless of labour market policies. 
Coefficients on the year dummies are plotted in Figure 5.  As seen in the raw data, there 
is a strong upward trend until about 1990 at which point the year effect flattens out. There is a 
continuation of the upward trend starting in 1997, but it is unknown whether this means it will 
continue to trend upwards. Figure 6 demonstrates, however, how important the secular trend 
appears to be relative to the effect of M/PL. Both lines plot predicted values for a “reference 
woman” – in this case, a married woman in Ontario, aged 30 to 34, with a high school education, 
and whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2.  One line represents the “pure” year effect by allowing 
the year to vary but sets the maximum leave variable to the overall average for the sample 
period.
24 The other line (with squares) also allows the year to vary, but this time the maximum 
leave variable is set to the yearly average (across provinces).  The difference between these two 
lines is the change in leave policy effect.  The size of the leave effect is quite small relative to the 
year effect. 
Note that in Canada, employees who work for federally regulated employers are covered 
by the Canada Labour Code.
25 The amount of unpaid leave stipulated by this federal statute is 
found in Table 1, column 2.  Unfortunately, the LFS only distinguishes whether an individual is a 
private sector employee, a public sector employee or self-employed.  The public sector category 
includes those who work for provincial governments (employees of provincial governments are 
covered by provincial legislation).  Therefore, it is unsatisfactory to assign the maximum leave as 
stipulated by the Canada Labour Code to all public employees.  Moreover, doing this leads to the 
prediction that an increase in M/PL allowance from 0 weeks to 52 weeks increases the probability 
of employment by 25%.
26  Obviously, this is a statistically significant result.  However, it is most 
likely to be a spurious result driven by the simultaneous occurrences of two events.  First, the 
federal jurisdiction was the only one to have an increase in M/PL allowances during the 1980s.  
Second, all provinces experienced strong growth in their employment rates during this period.  As 
such, it appears that the best solution (adopted here) is to assign the provincial legislation to all 




public employees and finds a stronger positive effect associated with longer job-protected leave 
and a stronger negative effect of having the youngest child aged 0 to 2 than was found in the base 
model. This result suggests that legislated leave plays a more important role among employees in 
the private sector. Data limitations prevent further exploration of this issue, however. 
 
Model Robustness 
  The results of this study hinge on the acceptability of defining women whose youngest 
child is aged 3 to 5 as a control group. If the control group is affected by M/PL in a way that is not 
accounted for, then the estimate of the impact of M/PL policy may be over or under estimated. 
There is possibility that women whose child is aged 1 to 2 are affected by M/PL policy similarly to 
women with youngest child aged 3 to 5.  Ideally, the group of interest should contain only those 
women who are directly affected by the legislation. It may be more appropriate to use women 
whose youngest child is aged 1 to 5 as a control group for women whose youngest child is less 
than one.  The latter group could conceivably be eligible for maternity or parental leave whereas 
mothers of older children are not eligible in Canada.  Using more detailed data on the age of the 
youngest child will allow this issue to be addressed in the future.  
  To test whether the estimated effect is robust to the use of other control groups available 
in the public-use LFS, the model was estimated using women whose youngest child was aged 6 
to 10.  The results can be found in Table 6.  Here η  is still negative and significant, but it is 
smaller relative to δ than previously.  This version of the model predicts a 6 to 7 percent increase 
in the employment rate of women whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2 when legislated job-
protected leave increases from 0 weeks to 52 weeks. Again note that controlling for M/PL, having 
a youngest child aged 0 to 2 has a strong negative effect on probability of employment. 
  Another specification of the model was also tried.  The effect of the provincial 
unemployment rate on the probability of employment was allowed to vary with the age of youngest 




unemployment rate. Results for both control groups can be found in Table 7. The negative 
effect of the unemployment rate is weaker for women whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2 than for 
either control group.  This suggests that labour market behaviour may be less affected by labour 
market conditions and more affected by personal attitudes when a woman’s child is very young.  
By the time the youngest child is aged 3 to 5 (and more so when the child is aged 6 to 10) 
economic conditions may start to play a larger role in labour market decisions. The versions of the 
model found in Table 7 lead to a predicted increase of 2 to 3 percent in the employment rate of 
women whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2 when the control group is women whose youngest 
child is 3 to 5 years of age and 5 to 6 percent when the control group is women whose youngest 
child is aged 6 to 10. 
  Finally, the primary model (Table 3) was re-estimated 10 times. Each time, respondents 
from one of the ten provinces were completely dropped from the sample.  While it varied in 
magnitude, the primary effect always remained positive and significant. Moreover, in all but one 
case, the primary effect outweighed the secondary effect leading to a prediction that increases in 
weeks of legislated M/PL will lead to increases in employment among mothers whose youngest 
child is aged 0 to 2. Predicted increases in the probability of employment ranged from 1.0 to 4.3 
percentage points when M/PL was allowed to increase from 0 to 52 weeks. When respondents 
from Quebec were dropped from the sample, the negative secondary effect, η, outweighed the 
positive primary effect, δ, resulting in the predication that employment of mothers would decrease 
with increases in weeks of M/PL. 
  In an effort to understand the presence of the negative and significant secondary effect, η, 
fathers whose youngest child was aged 0-2 was also tried as a control group.
27  This time a 
variable indicating the respondent’s sex and an interaction term between sex and M/PL were 
included. Generally the estimated coefficients on the individual characteristics were the same as 
in models using only women. As expected, mothers had a lower probability of employment than 
fathers, ceteris paribus. The direct impact of M/PL on mothers, δ, was estimated to be positive. 




the probability of employment for mothers of between 10.9 and 13.5 percentage points. As 
before, the secondary effect was estimated to be negative and significant suggesting that there is 
a negative association between increases in legislated M/PL and the probability of employment for 
both mothers and fathers whose youngest child is aged 0-2. Further estimation which restricted 
the sample to fathers whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2 and those fathers whose youngest child 
is aged 3 to 5 indicates that while there is no differential impact of M/PL on these two groups, the 
negative secondary effect persists.
28  
The persistence of the secondary effect, regardless of control group, suggests that the 
M/PL variable may be spuriously associated with decreases in employment. Perhaps provinces 
increased legislated weeks of M/PL during years when employment was low. While further 
investigation is warranted, the current results suggest that the true impact of the M/PL on mothers 
of young children is found in the coefficient on the interaction term (the primary effect). Regardless 
of specification or sample, this coefficient was always positive and significant suggesting that 
M/PL policy is indeed associated with increases in employment among women whose youngest 
child is aged 0 to 2. In fact, if one were to calculate predicated increases in the probability of 
employment based only on the primary effect, δ, the predicted impact of the policy would be even 
greater than that estimated here. 
 
Employed, but Absent 
 
An important issue raised by Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) is the distinction between 
“employment” and “work”; an individual may be employed, but not at work (e.g., they are on 
“leave”), during the survey reference week.  While absences from work can be costly for 
employers, they may increase productivity if the result is reduced conflict between work and 
family-life and / or provision of needed rest and respite from work.  In their paper, these authors 
develop a theory of the labour supply effects of maternity leave statutes. Their theory predicts that 




will therefore decrease.  
The public-use LFS used in this study provides some evidence on the impact of M/PL on 
absences from work. Not all those respondents who reported being employed during the survey 
reference week were at work during the reference week.  In fact, 13.2% of employed mothers 
were absent from their job for either all or part of the survey reference week; over 70% of these 
absences were for personal or family responsibilities.
29  Absences were much more common 
among women whose youngest child was aged 0 to 2; over 17% of these women were absent 
during the reference week, compared with only 7.2% of those whose youngest child was aged 3 to 
5. (Note that this observation is not surprising since the definition of “absence” used in the LFS 
includes those on M/PL.)  Of those absent from work, 80.1% of mothers whose youngest child 
was aged 0 to 2 were absent for personal or family responsibilities. Only 39.8% of women whose 
youngest child was aged 3 to 5 were absent for this reason.   
A probit model was used to estimate the probability of being absent from work during the 
survey reference week among all employed mothers whose youngest child was aged 0 to 5; 
results are presented in Table 8.  The directional impacts of the estimated coefficients are 
generally the same whether all absences or only absences for personal or family responsibilities 
are considered. Ceteris paribus, the probability of being absent from work decreases with age but 
increases with educational attainment.  Results also indicate that the probability of an absence 
has increased over time, is higher for those who are married, is  highest in Quebec and Ontario 
and, not surprisingly is higher for mothers whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2relative to those 
whose youngest child is aged 3 to 5.  
The coefficients estimated for the M/PL variables indicate that, there are two counter-
acting effects on the probability of being absent from work.  The primary effect, δ, is positive 
suggesting that an increase in the length of legislated job-protected leave increases the probability 
of being absent among those with the youngest child aged 0 to 2. This finding parallels the theory 
put forward by Klerman and Leibowitz (1997),  However, there appears to be a secondary effect, 




protected leave leads to an overall decrease in absences from work. The predicted decrease in 
the probability of being absent among the provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Alberta ranges from 
1.4 to 2.5 percentage points for those mothers with their youngest child aged 0-2. An overall 
depiction of the effect of M/PL on the probability of being absent from work can be found in Figure 
7. Here we see that M/PL does appear to counteract the upward trend in absences from work. 
One plausible explanation may include that overall absence levels decrease among 
mothers who have returned to work because longer M/PL leads to increased breastfeeding while 
on leave which, in turn, leads to improved child health and fewer family-related absences during 
the first 5 years of a child’s life. There is some support for this hypothesis. Chatterji and Frick 
(2003) find that returning to work within 3 months is associated with a reduction in the probability 
that a mother will initiate breastfeeding. Health research has indicated that breastfeeding can have 
long-term positive implications for a child’s health. However, it is clear that there is a need for 




VII.  Conclusion 
  This study finds that there is a small positive effect of M/PL policy on the female 
employment rate.  The model predicts that an increase in mandated job-protected unpaid leave 
from 0 to 52 weeks will lead to a 2.8 to 3.6 percent percent increase in the employment rate of 
women whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2. In spite of the positive effect of M/PL policy on the 
probability of employment, there remains a strong negative effect of having a child aged 0 to 2. 
  The significance of the (small) coefficient on the maximum leave variable implies either 
that M/PL has a negative employment impact on the control group or that maximum leave is 
correlated with an unobserved variable.  Using different specifications tested the robustness of the 
results – the positive association between M/PL policy and the probability of employment of 
women whose youngest child is aged 0 to 2 relative to women whose youngest child is aged 3 to 




  The estimated impact of the M/PL policies on the probability of employment is small 
relative to the secular trend. It is crucial to note, however, that the importance of M/PL policies 
may lie elsewhere. By allowing women to maintain employment during the period surrounding 
childbirth, M/PL policies may increase mothers’ long-term employment outcomes by increasing 
their seniority and wages. Moreover, these policies give employers some assurance that a woman 
will return to her job after childbirth thereby decreasing losses of job-specific capital. 
  Furthermore, as data becomes available, future research will be able to incorporate the 
most recent change in both the employment insurance program and provincially mandated job-
protected leave. As of January 2001, 35 weeks of parental EI benefits and approximately 37 
weeks of job-protected parental leave were made available in all provinces. Currently the 2001 
and the first quarter of 2002 are available from the LFS. However, it will be January 2004 before 
we can be sure that all women with a youngest child aged 0 to 2 would have had their child in or 
after January 2001. Until then, other data sources (or the master LFS files) will have to be used to 
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Table 1: Maximum Available Leave (in weeks) 
1 
Year Federal NFL  PEI  NS  NB  Québec  Ontario  Manitoba SAS  ALB  BC  UI/EI 
2 
1976  17  0  0  17 12  0  17 17 18 18 12 15 
1977  17  0  0  17 12  0  17 17 18 18 12 15 
1978  17  0  0  17 12  0  17 17 18 18 12 15 
1979  17 17  0  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 12 15 
1980  17 17  0  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1981  17 17  0  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1982  17 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1983  17 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1984  17 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1985  17 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1986  41 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1987  41 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1988  41 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1989  41 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 15 
1990  41 17 17  17 17  18 17 17 18 18 18 25 
1991  41 17 17  17 17  52 17 17 18 18 18 25 
1992  41 29 17  17 29  52 35 17 18 18 18 25 
1993  41 29 17  17 29  52 35 34 18 18 30 25 
1994  41 29 34  34 29  52 35 34 18 18 30 25 
1995  41 29 34  34 29  52 35 34 30 18 30 25 
1996  41 29 34  34 29  52 35 34 30 18 30 25 
1997  41 29 34  34 29  70 35 34 30 18 30 25 
1998  41 29 34  34 29  70 35 34 30 18 30 25 
1999  41 29 34  34 29  70 35 34 30 18 30 25 
2000  41 29 34  34 29  70 35 34 30 18 30 25 
Notes:      
1.  Column 2 outlines the maximum unpaid leave available under the Canada Labour Code.  The Canada Labour Code (which applies to federal employees) was the  
first to introduce parental (unpaid) leave.   
2.  To construct this table, it is assumed that the mother takes the full amount of leave in provinces where parental leave has to be shared between parents. 




Table 2: Weighted Summary Statistics 
Variable  Women with youngest Women with youngest  Women aged 15-44 
  child aged 0-2  child aged 3-5   
Average legislated 







Age of youngest own child (%)      
No child under 24  0.00  0.00  50.35 
0 to 2  100.00  0.00  15.06 
3 to 5  0.00  100.00  9.67 
6 to 12  0.00  0.00  16.11 
13 to 15  0.00  0.00  4.71 
16 to 17  0.00  0.00  2.16 
18 to 24  0.00  0.00  1.94 
Province (%)      
Newfoundland 2.03 2.40  2.17 
PEI 0.50  0.50  0.46 
Nova Scotia  3.10  3.37  3.27 
New Brunswick  2.62  2.82  2.69 
Québec 25.32  25.72  25.93 
Ontario 36.65  36.90  37.00 
Manitoba 4.03  3.87  3.76 
Saskatchewan 4.01 3.63  3.34 
Alberta 10.38  9.51  9.55 
British Columbia  11.35  11.28  11.85 
Marital Status (%)      
Married/common law  92.85  87.72  58.82 
Single-never married  4.15  4.61  35.14 
Widowed 0.17  0.50  0.54 
Separated/divorced 2.83  7.17  5.50 
Age (%)      
15 to 19  1.97  0.16  16.04 
20 to 24  17.58  5.96  17.24 
25 to 29  36.45  23.55  17.82 
30 to 34  30.01  36.62  17.80 
35 to 39  11.38  24.16  16.29 
40 to 44  2.25  8.02  14.81 
45 to 49  0.28  1.39  0.00 
50 to 54  0.07  0.14  0.00 
Educational Attainment (%)      
0 to 8 years  5.71  8.06  6.92 
9 to 10 years  14.10  15.89  18.31 
High School  34.15  33.50  31.44 
Some post-secondary  8.98  8.64  11.45 
Post sec. cert/diploma  23.16  22.37  20.23 
University 13.90  11.53  11.65 
Sample size  =   270,380  178,896  1,681,435 
1: Summary statistics are for all years (1976-2000) of the sample. 





Table 2: Weighted Summary Statistics (continued) 
Variable  Women with youngest  Women with youngest  Women aged 15-44 
  child aged 0-2  child aged 3-5   
       
Labour force  







Employment rate (%)  48.84  54.71  61.89 
Labour force status in 
reference week (%) 
    
Employed, at work   40.32  50.76  57.31 
Employed, absent from work  8.53  3.95  4.58 
Unemployed 6.28  6.74 6.92 
Not in the labour force  44.87  38.55  31.20 
Prime-age male 
unemployment rate (%) 
8.47 8.50  8.52 
Sample size  =   270,380  178,896  1,681,435 





Table 3: Probit Estimation Results – Primary Model 




Youngest child 0-2  -0.252***  0.008 
Maxleave*child aged 0-2 (δ) 0.003***  2.76E-04 
Newfoundland -0.169***  0.023 
PEI 0.146***  0.039 
Nova Scotia  -0.096***  0.016 
New Brunswick  -0.100***  0.018 
Québec -0.094***  0.009 
Manitoba -0.001  0.014 
Saskatchewan -0.019  0.015 
Alberta -0.072***  0.010 
British Columbia  -0.153***  0.010 
Unemployment rate  -0.015***  0.002 
1977 0.045***  0.014 
1978 0.117***  0.015 
1979 0.170***  0.014 
1980 0.226***  0.014 
1981 0.278***  0.014 
1982 0.308***  0.016 
1983 0.370***  0.017 
1984 0.401***  0.017 
1985 0.462***  0.016 
1986 0.505***  0.015 
1987 0.515***  0.015 
1988 0.527***  0.014 
1989 0.549***  0.014 
1990 0.557***  0.015 
1991 0.607***  0.017 
1992 0.615***  0.018 
1993 0.616***  0.018 
1994 0.602***  0.017 
1995 0.578***  0.016 
1996 0.605***  0.016 
1997 0.603***  0.016 
1998 0.615***  0.016 
1999 0.630***  0.016 
2000 0.651***  0.016 
Single-never married  -0.439***  0.010 
Widowed 0.113***  0.036 
Separated/divorced 0.119***  0.009 
1: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 when individual is 
employed (either on the job or absent during the survey reference week). 





Table 3: Estimation Results, Primary Model (continued) 
Variables  Coefficients   Standard Errors
Aged 15 to 19  -0.478***  0.020 
Aged 20 to 24  -0.140***  0.007 
Aged 25 to 29  -0.027***  0.005 
Aged 35 to 39  -0.019***  0.006 
Aged 40 to 44  -0.054***  0.010 
Aged 45 to 49  -0.123***  0.023 
Aged 50 to 54  -0.209***  0.063 
Educ: 0 to 8 years  -0.443***  0.009 
Educ: 9 to 10 years  -0.335***  0.006 
Some post secondary  0.075***  0.007 
Post sec. cert/diploma  0.342***  0.005 
University 0.457***  0.007 
nfl*march 0.010  0.029 
pei*march -0.081  0.056 
ns*march -0.015  0.023 
nb*march 0.003  0.026 
que*march 0.035***  0.009 
ont*march 0.002  0.007 
man*march 0.027  0.020 
sas*march -2.30E-04  0.020 
abl*march 0.020  0.013 
bc*march 0.010  0.012 
constant -0.105***  0.013 
Sample size  449,276   





Table 4: Predicted Employment Probabilities 
Province  Weeks of leave  High School  University 
Ontario 0  weeks  58.65  75.05 
 15  weeks  59.68 75.88 
 30  weeks  60.70 76.69 
 45  weeks  61.71 77.49 
 52  weeks  62.18 77.86 
Alberta 0  weeks  57.07  73.75 
 15  weeks  58.11 74.60 
 30  weeks  59.14 75.44 
 45  weeks  60.16 76.27 
 52  weeks  60.64 76.65 
Québec 0  weeks  54.29  71.40 
 15  weeks  55.34 72.29 
 30  weeks  56.38 73.17 
 45  weeks  57.42 74.03 
 52  weeks  57.90 74.43 
Note: This table predicts the effect of increase in unpaid weeks of Maternity/parental 
leave available for a reference woman.  The reference woman is a woman in 2000 who 
is 30-34 years old, whose youngest child is aged 0-2, who is married and whose 






Table 5: Estimation Results (no public employees) 
Variables  Coefficients   Standard Errors
Maximum leave (η) -1.00E-04  3.16E-04 
Youngest child 0-2  -0.282  0.009 
Maxleave*child aged 0-2 (δ) 0.004  3.01E-04 
Newfoundland -0.225  0.027 
PEI 0.131  0.045 
Nova Scotia  -0.126  0.019 
New Brunswick  -0.135  0.020 
Québec -0.144  0.010 
Manitoba -0.033  0.016 
Saskatchewan -0.056  0.017 
Alberta -0.072  0.011 
British Columbia  -0.129  0.011 
Unemployment rate  -0.022  0.002 
1977 0.053  0.016 
1978 0.131  0.016 
1979 0.171  0.016 
1980 0.231  0.016 
1981 0.286  0.016 
1982 0.335  0.018 
1983 0.396  0.019 
1984 0.429  0.019 
1985 0.496  0.018 
1986 0.534  0.017 
1987 0.554  0.017 
1988 0.567  0.016 
1989 0.596  0.016 
1990 0.602  0.016 
1991 0.659  0.018 
1992 0.680  0.020 
1993 0.676  0.020 
1994 0.664  0.019 
1995 0.640  0.018 
1996 0.675  0.018 
1997 0.690  0.018 
1998 0.688  0.017 
1999 0.699  0.017 
2000 0.712  0.017 
Single-never married  -0.475  0.011 
Widowed 0.147  0.039 
Separated/divorced 0.147  0.010 
1: Table 5 is continued on next page. 
2: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 







Table 5: Estimation Results (continued)  
(no public employees) 
Variables  Coefficients   Standard Errors
Aged 15 to 19  -0.396  0.021 
Aged 20 to 24  -0.067  0.007 
Aged 25 to 29  0.006  0.005 
Aged 35 to 39  -0.050  0.007 
Aged 40 to 44  -0.094  0.011 
Aged 45 to 49  -0.186  0.026 
Aged 50 to 54  -0.236  0.067 
Educ: 0 to 8 years  -0.356  0.009 
Educ: 9 to 10 years  -0.290  0.006 
Some post secondary  0.047  0.008 
Post sec. cert/diploma  0.191  0.006 
University 0.200  0.008 
nfl*march 0.002  0.033 
pei*march -0.053  0.064 
ns*march -0.012  0.026 
nb*march -0.007  0.029 
que*march 0.042  0.010 
ont*march 0.011  0.008 
man*march 0.019  0.022 
sas*march -0.005  0.023 
abl*march 0.033  0.014 
bc*march 0.008  0.013 
constant -0.210  0.015 








1: Estimation Results (control - youngest 6-10) 
Variables  Coefficients   Standard Errors
Maximum leave (η) -8.76E-04  2.28E-04 
Youngest child 0-2  -0.532  0.008 
Maxleave*child aged 0-2 (δ) 0.004  2.35E-04 
Newfoundland -0.237  0.020 
PEI 0.086  0.034 
Nova Scotia  -0.146  0.014 
New Brunswick  -0.143  0.015 
Québec -0.134  0.008 
Manitoba 0.019  0.013 
Saskatchewan 0.011  0.013 
Alberta -0.037  0.009 
British Columbia  -0.136  0.008 
Unemployment rate  -0.017  0.001 
1977 0.054  0.012 
1978 0.111  0.012 
1979 0.143  0.012 
1980 0.198  0.012 
1981 0.255  0.012 
1982 0.279  0.013 
1983 0.320  0.015 
1984 0.343  0.014 
1985 0.387  0.014 
1986 0.435  0.013 
1987 0.456  0.013 
1988 0.485  0.012 
1989 0.528  0.012 
1990 0.530  0.013 
1991 0.557  0.014 
1992 0.547  0.015 
1993 0.545  0.015 
1994 0.534  0.014 
1995 0.517  0.014 
1996 0.537  0.014 
1997 0.543  0.014 
1998 0.534  0.013 
1999 0.553  0.014 
2000 0.560  0.013 
1 Table is continued on next page. 
2: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 when individual is 
employed (either on the job or absent during survey week). 
 
 





Table 6: Estimation Results (continued) 
 (control - youngest 6-10) 
Variables  Coefficients   Standard Errors
Single-never married  -0.421  0.010 
Widowed -0.092  0.019 
Separated/divorced -0.084  0.007 
Aged 15 to 19  -0.523  0.020 
Aged 20 to 24  -0.173  0.007 
Aged 25 to 29  -0.040  0.005 
Aged 35 to 39  0.009  0.005 
Aged 40 to 44  -0.033  0.006 
Aged 45 to 49  -0.164  0.008 
Aged 50 to 54  -0.423  0.013 
Educ: 0 to 8 years  -0.484  0.006 
Educ: 9 to 10 years  -0.319  0.005 
Some post secondary  0.055  0.006 
Post sec. cert/diploma  0.290  0.005 
University 0.413  0.006 
nfl*march 0.016  0.024 
pei*march -0.057  0.048 
ns*march -0.013  0.019 
nb*march 0.013  0.022 
que*march 0.036  0.008 
ont*march 0.019  0.006 
man*march 0.028  0.018 
sas*march 0.007  0.018 
abl*march 0.042  0.011 
bc*march 0.029  0.010 
constant 0.220  0.011 










Table 7: Estimation results (with UE rate * ychild) 
For control group = youngest child aged 3 to 5 




Youngest child 0-2  -0.351  0.012 
Maxleave*child aged 0-2 (δ) 0.002  2.80E-04 
Unemployment (UE) rate  -0.023  0.002 
UE rate*child aged 0-2  0.013  0.001 
    
    
For control group = youngest child aged 6 to 10 




Youngest child 0-2  -0.690  0.010 
Maxleave*child aged 0-2 (δ) 0.003  2.39E-04 
Unemployment (UE) rate  -0.027  0.002 
UE rate*child aged 0-2  0.021  0.001 
 
1: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the individual is 







1: Estimation Results: Employed & Absent 
  All absences  Absence for personal or family 
responsibilities 
Variables  Coefficients   Standard Errors Coefficients   Standard Errors
Maximum leave (η) -0.007***  5.90E-04  -0.009*** 0.001 
Youngest child 0-2  0.317***  0.017  0.501*** 0.021 
Maxleave*child aged 0-2 (δ) 0.006***  5.27E-04  0.008*** 0.001 
Newfoundland -0.045  0.049  -0.263*** 0.059 
PEI -0.117  0.075  -0.248*** 0.086 
Nova Scotia  -0.052  0.033  -0.115*** 0.036 
New Brunswick  -0.092***  0.037  -0.201*** 0.041 
Quebec 0.170***  0.017  0.140***   0.019 
Manitoba -0.036  0.027  -0.060** 0.029 
Saskatchewan -0.104***  0.028  -0.176*** 0.031 
Alberta -0.073***  0.019  -0.107**** 0.020 
British Columbia  0.061***  0.018  -0.056*** 0.020 
Unemployment rate  -0.005  0.003  -0.002 0.004 
1977 -0.004  0.036  0.038 0.047 
1978 0.044  0.036  0.072 0.046 
1979 0.066*  0.034  0.200*** 0.043 
1980 0.060*  0.034  0.209*** 0.043 
1981 0.067**  0.034  0.255*** 0.042 
1982 0.051  0.036  0.211*** 0.045 
1983 0.143***  0.038  0.327*** 0.046 
1984 0.241***  0.036  0.364*** 0.045 
1985 0.190***  0.035  0.351*** 0.043 
1986 0.167***  0.034  0.359*** 0.042 
1987 0.248***  0.033  0.438*** 0.041 
1988 0.246***  0.032  0.473*** 0.039 
1989 0.192***  0.031  0.459*** 0.039 
1990 0.298***  0.032  0.555*** 0.040 
1991 0.398***  0.035  0.596*** 0.043 
1992 0.440***  0.037  0.622*** 0.045 
1993 0.471***  0.037  0.653*** 0.045 
1994 0.394***  0.035  0.625*** 0.043 
1995 0.405***  0.034  0.666*** 0.042 
1996 0.395***  0.034  0.655*** 0.042 
1997 0.425***  0.034  0.671*** 0.042 
1998 0.408***  0.033  0.675*** 0.041 
1999 0.467***  0.033  0.723*** 0.041 
2000 0.358***  0.033  0.661*** 0.041 
Single-never married  -0.232***  0.025  -0.182*** 0.027 
Widowed 0.047  0.072  -0.384*** 0.119 
Separated/divorced -0.223***  0.021  -0.158*** 0.025 
1.  Table is continued on next page. 
2.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 when individual is employed  and is equal to 0 when individual 




Table 8: Estimation Results: Employed & Absent (continued) 
Variables  Coefficients   Standard Errors Coefficients   Standard Errors
Aged 15 to 19  -0.049  0.056  0.081 0.057 
Aged 20 to 24  0.105***  0.013  0.163*** 0.014 
Aged 25 to 29  0.058***  0.009  0.102*** 0.010 
Aged 35 to 39  -0.032***  0.010  -0.141*** 0.012 
Aged 40 to 44  -0.034*  0.018  -0.245*** 0.024 
Aged 45 to 49  -0.015  0.047  -0.361*** 0.071 
Aged 50 to 54  -0.231*  0.137  -1.314*** 0.371 
Educ: 0 to 8 years  -0.132***  0.023  -0.119*** 0.027 
Educ: 9 to 10 years  -0.093***  0.014  -0.107*** 0.016 
Some post secondary  0.021  0.014  0.011 0.015 
Post sec. cert/diploma  0.129***  0.009  0.088*** 0.011 
University 0.253***  0.011  0.158*** 0.012 
nfl*march 0.042  0.063  0.026 0.075 
pei*march 0.316***  0.104  0.082 0.125 
ns*march 0.398***  0.042  -0.070 0.051 
nb*march 0.040  0.053  0.040 0.060 
que*march -0.001  0.017  -0.035* 0.019 
ont*march 0.290***  0.012  -0.053*** 0.014 
man*march -0.040  0.038  0.002 0.041 
sas*march -0.029  0.040  0.012 0.044 
abl*march -0.063***  0.025  -0.018 0.027 
bc*march 0.036  0.022  -0.034 0.026 
constant -1.666***  0.031  -2.091*** 0.040 
sample  size  215228  215,228  








Figure 2: Employment rates for Alberta and Quebec:




















































Figure 3: Employment rates for women with youngest child aged 3 to 5: 























Figire 4: Employment rates for women with youngest child aged 0 to 2: 


















































probit coefficients on year dummies
Figure 6: Trend effect versus job-protected leave effect: 


































Figure 7: Trend effect versus job protected leave effect on 
probabilty of being employed, but absent during the reference week; 


























Table A1: Summary of Available UI/EI Benefits 
Year  Paid Leave Available  Requirements  Restrictions 
Jun-71  15 weeks  Natural mother  Benefits had to be collected in the 15 weeks surrounding birth. 
  66.67%  20 or more insurable weeks  Specifically, they had to be collected in the period 8 weeks 
  Max. $100/week  Magic 10 rule applies (see note 2)  before birth and 6 weeks after week of birth. 
Jan-76  15 weeks  Natural mother  Now benefits could be collected as early as 8 weeks before 
    20 or more insurable weeks in last 52  the expected week of birth or as late as 17 weeks after the 
    Magic 10 rule applies (see note 2)  week of birth 
Jan-84  15 weeks  Natural mother  Benefits could be collected in the period consisting of 8 
  60%  20 or more insurable weeks in last 52  weeks before and 17 weeks after week of birth.  Any earnings 
  Max. $276/week  Magic 10 rule dropped  were deducted from benefits. 
    
  15 weeks  Adoptive parents  Benefits could be collected in the 17-week period following 
      the placement of child in the home. Only one adoptive parent 
     can  collect. 
Mar-88  15 weeks  Natural mother  Benefits could be collected in the period consisting of 8 
(Retroactive to  60%  20 or more insurable weeks in last 52  weeks before and 17 weeks after week of birth.  Any earnings 
March 1987)  Max. $318/week    were deducted from benefits. 
 
  Natural father  Benefits could be collected in the 17-week period following 
  20 or more insurable weeks in last 52  the arrival of child in the home. 
 
  Adoptive parents  Benefits could be collected in the 17-week period following 
  20 or more insurable weeks in last 52  the placement of child in the home. Only one adoptive parent 
 can  collect. 
 
  For all parents, if child was hospitalized, the period during 
  which benefits were payable was extended for the number of 
  weeks the child was hospitalized.  This period could not 




Table A1: Available Benefits (continued) 
Year  Paid Leave Available  Requirements  Restrictions 
Nov-90  15 weeks  Natural mother  Overall total of special benefits could not exceed 30 weeks. 
  60%  20 or more insurable weeks in last 52  If mother also collected parental benefits, they had to be  
  Max. $400/week  collected immediately after maternity leave benefits. 
  
  10 weeks  Natural parents (shared)  Parental benefits had to be collected within 52 weeks of 
    child's arrival at home. 
  
  10 weeks  Adoptive parents  15 weeks were allowed if the child was six months or older 
    when placed in home or if the child suffered from a physical, 
    psychological or emotional condition. 
  
Jun-96  15 weeks  Natural mother  For mothers collecting maternity benefits, parental benefits 
  55%  700 insurable hours in the past year.  had to follow the maternity benefits (unless the child was 
 Max.  $413/week  hospitalized). 
  
  10 weeks  Natural parents (shared)  Benefit period began the week the child was born and ended 
    700 insurable hours in the past year.  52 weeks later. 
  
  10 weeks  Adoptive parents  Benefit period began the week the child was placed and 
    700 insurable hours in the past year.  and ended 52 weeks later . 
1: Benefits in this summary are only those included in the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 and the Employment Insurance Act, 1996. 
    In addition to these benefits, SUB plans and contract between employees and companies often include additional benefits. 
2: The "Magic 10 Rule" required ten or more weeks of insurable employment in the twenty weeks that immediately preceded the thirtieth 
    week before expected date of birth. 
3: Placement of more than one child counted as one. 
4: All benefits required a two-week waiting period.  In the case where a natural mother collected both maternity and parental leave benefits 






                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 Maternity leave is available only to the mother, usually only a natural mother.  Parental leave is 
available to both parents and in many cases to adoptive parents as well. 
 
2 The weeks of parental EI benefits were eventually increased from 10 to 35 weeks and the 
number of hours of insurable employment needed to qualify for both maternity and parental 
benefits was reduced from 700 to 600. 
 
3 For studies on maternity and parental leave policy in Canada see Schwartz, 1988; Moloney, 
1989; Phipps 1995, and Phipps, 1998; and Marshall 1999 and Marshall 2003. 
 
4 Prior to 1996, Canada’s insurance program was called Unemployment Insurance (UI). With the 
reforms in 1996, the name of the program was changed to Employment Insurance (EI) and UI 
benefits became known as EI benefits. This paper covers the period both before and after the 
reform, hence the abbreviations UI/EI will be used. 
 
5 In this paper “leave” will always refer to unpaid time off from work, whereas, “benefits” will refer 
to any monetary compensation that is provided for maternity and parental reasons. 
 
6The Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) was introduced in March 1978.  It provided an 
additional vehicle through which policy issues could be raised.  Some of the first complaints regarding 
the Unemployment Insurance Act concerned section 30 and 46. Section 30 concerned the “Magic 10” 
rule, a regulation insuring women were employed around the time of conception.  This part of section 
30 was repealed in 1984.  Section 46 prevented women who were pregnant from receiving regular UI 
benefits during the period starting eight weeks prior to expected week of birth and six weeks after 
birth.   In 1983, the Canadian Human Rights Act was amended to include “pregnancy” as an additional 
ground of discrimination.  Section 46 was finally repealed that same year.  
 
7 Payments received by employees in addition to UI/EI benefits are often referred to as “top up” 
payments. SUB plans are particularly prevalent in Québec.  The first major SUB plan for maternity 
benefits was negotiated in Québec in 1979 (Moloney, 1989). Since a change in the Regulations in 
1993, maternity and parental leave top ups no longer fall under the SUB regulations.  However, 
monies paid to employees during a maternity/parental leave are not counted as earnings for the 
purposes of section 35 of the Employment Insurance Act. 
 
8 Federal employment standards (found in the Canada Labour Code) apply to federal employees, 
crown corporations and other industries that are regulated by the federal government. 
 
9 British Columbia’s Maternity Protection Act, 1966, and amendments to the Minimum 
Employment Standards Act, 1964, of New Brunswick provided for 12 weeks of leave of which 6 
had to be postnatal. Both Acts also protected against dismissal for reasons due to pregnancy for a 
period of 16 weeks. 
 
10 The Canada Labour Code applies to federal employees, crown corporations and other 





                                                                                                                                                   
11 For studies on maternity and parental leave policy in Canada see Schwartz, 1988; Moloney, 
1989; Phipps 1995, and Phipps, 1998; and Marshall 1999 and Marshall 2003. 
 
12 This report used the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP) for 1995-1998 to investigate 
the implications of the change from Unemployment Insurance (UI) to Employment Insurance (EI), 
a legislative change that took place in 1996. 
 
13 Unless these women have someone to care for their children for free while they return to work, 
the costs of child-care will influence their labour market behaviour.  Unfortunately, data on the cost 
of child-care for the entire sample period is not readily available and, therefore, cannot be 
controlled for; presumably, child-care costs will influence these two groups of women in a similar 
fashion. It is recognized, however, that some differences in child-care costs may exist between 
these two groups of women. Generally, child care for children aged 0-2 is more expensive than for 
children aged 3-5. The coefficient on the variable indicating that a woman’s youngest child was 
aged 0-2 will pick up this differential. 
 
14 Note that income and earnings information is not available in the LFS for the years used in this 
study. 
 
15 It is  ml η  that makes equation (1) different from a true difference-in-differences model. 
16The residents of the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Indian reserves are excluded.  The 
Yukon has been included in the LFS since 1992 but the sample size is too small to be considered 
reliable on a monthly basis. 
 
17 The sample of women whose youngest child is aged 0-5 includes women outside the 15-44 age 
group. However, as can be seen later in Table 2, only a small percentage of these women are 
aged over 44. 
 
18The LFS provides the age of respondents in five-year groups. In choosing the child bearing age 
range I was limited to 15-44, 20-44, 15-50, or 20-54.   
 
19 In the LFS less than one-fifth to one-half of a percent of the women who had children aged 0 to 
2 were older than 44 for the period sampled. 
 
20 The employment rate used here refers to the proportion of the population of interest that is 
employed. Unlike the unemployment rate, it is not a proportion of only those in the labour force. 
 
21  The difference in the employment rate between women whose youngest child was aged 3 to 5 
in Alberta versus the same women in Quebec was statistically significant at the 5% level in all 
years except for 2000. Moreover, the average difference decreased from 12.3% in the 1976-1980 
period, to 5.3% in the 1996-2000 period. 
 
22 The negative effect of young children on both employment and wages is a familiar result in the 
literature.  See, for example, Waldfogel et al. (1999) and Waldfogel (1997). 
 
23While most of the dummies that account for seasonality were statistically insignificant, they were 
jointly significant. 
 
24All years and all provinces contributed to the average length of leave and were weighted by 





                                                                                                                                                   
25Federally regulated employers include those who work for most federal Crown Corporations, 
federal Special Operating Agencies and private businesses necessary for the operation of a 
federal Act, those who work in interprovincial trucking, shipping, ports, canals, tunnels and 
bridges, those who work in air transportation including airlines, airports and aerodomes, those who 
for work railways, telephone, telegraph and cable systems, those who work in radio and television 
broadcasting (including cable vision), those who work for banks, in grain elevators, feed and seed 
mills, uranium mining and processing, those who work for a business dealing with the protection of 
fisheries as a natural resource and those who work in many First Nations activities. Finally, 
anyone who works directly for the federal government is also federally regulated. 
26 Full results for this model are available from the author. 
 
27 Estimation results for this model are available from the author. 
 
28 Estimation results for this model are available from the author. 
 
29 Individuals reported being absent for either the full week or part of the week for one of the 
following reasons: (a) own illness of disability, (b) personal or family responsibilities, (c) vacation 
or civic holiday, or (d) working short-time or (e) other. 
30 The master LFS files tend to be only available to employees of Statistics Canada and hence 
were not used in this paper. 